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PRELIMINARY STATEMENT. 
'1 lus is an appeal ol'.i dial < '.mrfs urant of summary judgment and post -judgment refusal 
to alter or amend judgment on the bases of "duty" and statute of limitations dispiles m .• medii ••' 
malpractice action Robert Joseph, i IOMHU Sail I ,ikt iil'i Police Officer, filed against David L. 
Mti 'ait" 'v ' ' . F.A.P.A. On appeal is the question that can a claimant present a fraud cause of 
action after a previous negligence claim was tune-baned v, hen il u .r. discovered after li»'t!.aion 
commencedth.il Hit. docloi had Ilaudulently concealed his tortuous misconduct. In this matter, 
Hit doctor's conduct was concealed that he was retained by SLC to act as an c\pcri "Hmv' i<>r 
SLC against Joseph in the former emplo> tv •,•• «i • i -.:c the officer. The second 
question beloii in* ' '"i , iIt>es tin- Utah Health Care Malpractice Act (UHCMA), § 78-14-1 ei 
seq. create a duty for an admitted health care provider who while claiming to be an independent 
medical examiner, but who in this case, specifically and expressly identified Joseph as his 
patient, who was acting under a contract to perform a specific act involving the forensic 
psychiatric evaluation and fitness of the Plaintiff. The forensic psychiatric service provided was 
similar to others relating to or arising out of the health needs of persons or groups of persons and 
officers, employees, or agents of any of the above acting in the course and scope of their 
employment. 
STATEMENT RELATED TO OTHER APPEALS 
1) The mental health evaluation or otherwise known as the "fitness for duty 
examination" was the subject matter of the related appeal Joseph v. Salt Lake City Civil Service 
Comm % 53 P.3d 11 (Utah Ct. App. 2002). (Case No. 20010399-CA). The report contained 
deliberately false diagnoses, not just information negligently concluded. 
As the published opinion reflects, Appellate Judge William A. Thorne quoted the report: 
[He] has Disordered Personality Traits which have contributed to him placing himself in 
jeopardy in the shooting incident and in other incidents. Officer Joseph's personality traits 
have caused him to be excessively self-centered and unwilling to learn from peers or 
superiors. His personality traits are likely to lead him to increased isolation and 
alienation from appropriate professional supervision and the needs of the citizens of Salt 
Lake City. Personality traits similar to those of Officer Joseph's are notably resistant to 
psychotherapeutic intervention, additional training, closer supervision or disciplinary 
action. His personality traits cause an increased risk for harm to himself, to other officers 
and to the citizens of Salt Lake City. In [Dr. McCann's] opinion, Officer Joseph is not 
psychologically suitable to perform the duties of a police officer. 
Id., at 13-14. (R. at 140). (ATTACHMENT C). Prior to filing Mr. Joseph's medical malpractice 
action, Plaintiff believed the determination was the result of negligence. (R. at 87, TJ8; 131; 174; 
177-79; 193; 195-96). After the commencement of the lawsuit and after discovery exchanged, 
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Dr. McCann, a health care provider, revealed evidence demonstrating that his evaluation was the 
result of fraud, not previously made known to Mr. Joseph. (R. at 92; 177; 186-87) 
2) Robert L. Joseph's 20-day suspension appeal from the Salt Lake City Civil Service 
Commission was case no. 2001111-CA Memorandum Decision (filed July 26, 2002) 
(Unpublished). (ATTACHMENT D). Because the evidentiary threshold for civil service 
commission hearings is so low, on appeal the decision was upheld. The "substantial evidence 
standard" is the burden of proof is civil service proceedings. Lee v. Provo City Civil Serv. 
Comm % 582 P.2d 485 (Utah 1978). See also, Schmidt v. Utah State Tax Comm '«, 980 P.2d 690 
(Utah Ct. App. 1999) ("The court must review the Commission's findings of fact under a 
'substantial evidence' standard, (citations omitted). In other words, the court of appeals must 
uphold those findings of fact that are supported by substantial evidence, or 'that quantum and 
quality of relevant evidence which is adequate to convince a reasonable mind to support a 
conclusion.' (citations omitted). The court of appeals must review the Commission's conclusions 
of law for correctness, (citations omitted by the court)." 
In that matter based upon the quantum of evidence presented, the record when viewed as 
a whole, the Commission upheld Robert Joseph's 20-day suspension determining that their was 
substantial evidence demonstrating that Joseph did violate department policy when he shot at or 
from a moving vehicle. The question of law whether Joseph was "justified" in the use of deadly 
force pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-404 (1953, as amended) was not decided by the 
commission. 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court by Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(4) (1953, as 
amended). (The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over matters transferred to it by the 
Utah Supreme Court), The Order of the Court granting summary judgment is 
ATTACHMENT A. The Order denying to alter or amend judgment is ATTACHMENT B. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES. 
(1) Whether defendant, David L. McCann, M.D., F.A.P.A. owed plaintiff, Robert L. 
Joseph, a duty of care during his assessment, evaluation, and report of Mr. Joseph "fitness for 
duty" as a police officer, or is McCann free to make any false, salacious or malicious statements 
about Mr. Joseph he wanted? Plaintiff contends that the UHCMA created a duty where the 
health care provider (1) called Plaintiff a "patient," (2) acted under signed contract, and (3) 
performed a service (the forensic psychiatric evaluation) typically rendered by others providing 
similar to care or services. 
(2) Whether defendant, David L. McCann's statute of limitation's affirmative defense 
was waived concerning plaintiff, Robert L. Joseph's negligence claim, and that the statute of 
limitations was tolled by Dr. McCann by his fraudulent concealment of misconduct. The 
discovery occurred during the discovery phase of litigation. At that time, plaintiff discovered 
that Dr. McCann acted fraudulently by both misrepresenting himself as independent and through 
material omission of "confidential" correspondence between he and the city? Plaintiff contends 
"yes." The statute of limitation affirmative defense was waived by the latter discovery that Dr. 
McCann's fitness for duty report of Joseph was planned and not the product or result of an 
impartial assessment and evaluation. The typical forensic psychiatric evaluation requires 
disclosure of materials provided for consideration. In this matter, "confidential" material was not 
disclosed until during discovery in litigation commenced and he did not reveal he was hired to be 
SLC's "expert witness." Section 78-14-4(l)(b) is the exception applicable in this matter which 
forms the basis of this court's decision to remand the matter to the trial court. 
STANDARDS OF REVIEW. 
This is an appeal of the trial court's award of summary judgment to the moving defendant. The 
well-established law requires the fact be interpreted in the light most favorable to the non-
moving party: 
In this appeal, we review four questions: whether the district court (1) correctly concluded 
that the duties at issue were tort, rather than contractual, duties because they existed at 
common law independent of any contract or agreement, (2) applied the appropriate statute, 
of limitations period, (3) correctly granted CRG's summary judgment motion, and (4) 
acted within its discretion in denying the County's rule 56(f) motion for a continuance. 
The first three questions present issues of law. We therefore review them for correctness 
and give no deference to the district court's conclusions. See State v. Tooele County, 2002 
UT 8, P8,44 P.3d 680 (stating that a district court's grant of summary judgment is 
reviewed for correctness); Estes v. Tibbs, 1999 UT 52, P4, 979 P.2d 823 (holding that a 
district "court's application of a statute of limitations presents a question of law"); Weber 
v. Springville City, 725 P.2d 1360, 1363 (Utah 1986) (explaining that the "question of 
whether a 'duty' exists is a question of law"). We review the final question under an 
abuse of discretion standard, however. Crossland Sav. v. Hatch, 877 P.2d 1241, 1243 
(Utah 1994). 
P17 In reviewing the district court's summary judgment ruling, we add that the court's 
decision can be upheld only if no genuine issues of material fact existed and CRG was 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). 
Salt Lake County v. Western Dairymen Coop, Inc., 48 P.3d 910 (Utah 2002). 
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STATUTES, RULES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-1 (2002) Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-4 (2002) 
Utah R.Civ. P. 56 Utah Code Ann. § 78-25-25 (2002) 
STATEMENTS OF THE CASE. 
I. Nature of the Case: 
This case arises from the trial court's grant of summary and apparent desire for an 
appellate court to create precedent authority in Utah concerning the question of whether under 
the UHCMA, physicians representing to act as an independent medical examiner (IME) owe a 
duty of care to admitted "patients" under contract for services they provide which is similar to 
other physicians. Joseph believes that the trial court was proper to want stare decisis out of this 
Court - the question is an important question of state law. 
At the oral arguments hearing for summary judgment the colloquy concerning a 
physicians duty went: 
MR. EYRE: I will be brief and leave plaintiffs counsel some time. The other issues 
has to do with this notice of basically exert witness malpractice, is what it 
amounts to, and every court in the country that has addressed this has said 
there is no legal duty, there are ample public policy reasons for this; 
namely, if you start allowing the losing party in a controversy or lawsuit to 
sue the experts on the other side it will have a chilling effect on access to 
the courts and it would stem or start an endless flow of litigation. 
Unfortunately, there is not a Utah case directly in point. 
THE COURT: Why? 
(T.at8).1 
1
 The transcript is marked as "T" because the individual pages except for the front cover has 
a record pagination. The transcript cover itself is marked as, the record at 590. 
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II. Course of the Proceedings: 
This matter commenced on October 14, 2003 by the filing of a Complaint for medical 
malpractice consisting of 56 paragraph allegations. R. at 3-12. Defendant, David L. McCann, 
M.D., F.A.P.A. filed an Answer on November 14, 2003; it was largely non-responsive to the 
allegations pled by plaintiff. R. at 15-20. Within the Answer, at paragraph 13, denies acting 
negligent, but nowhere within the Answer does Dr. McCann acting fraudulent as alleged in 
Joseph's paragraphs 45-51. (R. at 9-10, 18). 
Following the closure of the parties' pleadings, discovery commenced. On January 25, 
2004, defendant disclosed a copy of his files. Within the files, was included a letter from Lyn 
Creswell, one of city's attorneys for Salt Lake City. Salt Lake City was Joseph's former 
employer as this Court is aware from the companion case Joseph v. Salt Lake City Civil Serv. 
Comm % 53 P.3d 11 (Utah Ct. App. 2002). (Case No. 20010399-CA). 
The letter, dated January 31, 2000 was marked "CONFIDENTIAL" and was never 
previously or subsequently disclosed by Salt Lake City for any reason. R. at 193. Mr. Creswell 
addressed the letter to Dr. McCann. The doctor did not reveal the letter as part of the materials 
received as part of his report, consistent with the standards and practices accepted by this Court, 
the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, 3rd Edition (DSM-III), then 
published. See State v. White, 880 P.2d 18, 24 n. 2 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). Also, admittedly Dr. 
McCann represented to Joseph to conduct himself pursuant to the Ethical Guidelines for the 
Practice of Forensic Psychiatry. (R. at 128). 
Following discovery, the defendant, Dr. McCann, moved for summary judgment on June 
7, 2004. (R. at 82-143.) Plaintiff, Mr. Joseph, responded opposing summary judgment on July 
7 
27, 2004. (R. at 174-213). The response included an affidavit from another physician and 
attorney, Robert K. Rothfeder, M.D., J.D. He submitted documentary evidence opposing 
summary judgment opposing Dr. McCann's claim that he had no legal duty of care to Mr. Joseph 
during his psychiatric evaluation, assessment, and reporting identifying two bases for a duty, one 
being the UHCMA and the other being HDPAA, an act of the Congress. (R. at 202-06). The 
memorandum also had attached a copy of the CONFIDENTIAL" letter of Salt Lake City 
Attorney, Lyn Creswell (which was disclosed for the first time in this litigation). (R. at 193). Dr. 
McCann filed his reply memorandum on August 9, 2004. (R. at 304-22). Additionally, on 
October 6, 2004, Mr. Joseph filed supplemental memorandum in opposition to summary 
judgment. (R. at 384-413). That memorandum contained excerpts of Dr. McCann's testimony 
from his March 10, 2004 deposition. (R. at 390-403). Additionally, Joseph provided the excerpt 
of Mr. David Greer's testimony. Greer was, at that time, the Salt Lake City Union 
Representative. McCann's report indicated receiving information from an interview with Mr. 
Greer. Mr. Greer, however, testified never speaking to Dr. McCann. (R. at 407-13, 411). 
Once the motion was submitted for decision, the Court conducted a hearing giving the 
parties' an opportunity for oral arguments. The hearing was heard on January 27, 2005. (R. at 
590). During oral arguments, the Court was reminded about the discovery of fraud matter being 
realized from the January 25, 2004 disclosure of the Lyn Creswell letter. 
MR. OLIVER: 
. . .on January 25th, on January 25th, we're informed at that time of the Lynn (sic) 
Creswell matter, we're also told - - January 25, 2004 - - we're also told at that 
time that Dr. McCann has relied on the representations of the union representative 
and that is shown Officer Greer and Officer Greer in his testimony said he never 
spoke with Dr. McCann. So as we have gone through this process, the discovery 
actually of the malpractice is still ongoing because we're finding this out even 
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after we filed the action. Now, I don't think that post-discovery is what we're 
talking about but I am showing the Cour that so that the Court understands that 
even with our latest discovery process that we gone through with Dr. McCann, 
we're still in the process of finding that statements made and relied upon or 
apparently relied upon were inaccurate. 
T. at 15-16. 
At the end of the hearing, the court granted summary judgment making her findings. (T. 
at 22-24). Nowhere did the judge address the issue of discovering the existence of a fraud or that 
the motion for summary judgment actually had been filed untimely essentially waiving the 
dismissal on that grounds. 
A Summary Judgment order was entered on April 25, 2005. Following the entry of the 
order, on May 4, 2005, Mr. Joseph moved the court to alter judgment to address the fraud 
discovery claim previously ignored by the court at oral arguments. (R. at 555-67). Dr. McCann 
opposed the motion on May 18, 2005. (R. at 569-75). The court denied the motion on 
September 27, 2005, claiming plaintiff "once again argues the issue of the tunning of statute of 
limitations. Plaintiff raises no new issues regarding the statute of limitations . . . nor does he 
allege any legal error. He simply seeks to have this Court reconsider its ruling. This Court finds 
no basis to do so." (R. at 579). 
III. Disposition in Trial Court: 
Summary Judgment was awarded to the Defendant on both the grounds that statute of 
limitations had run and that Dr. McCann acted as an ME, an expert witness only for Salt Lake 
City and therefore owed no duty at all to Mr. Joseph. However, disputed before the Court was 
whether Dr. McCann through material omissions and false misrepresentations, one, effectively 
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tolled or waived the statute of limitations defense through fraudulent acts; and, two, violated the 
UHCMA rising to a level of a cause of action as defined in the Act. "Tort ' means any legal 
wrong, breach of duty, or negligence or unlawful act or omission proximately causing injury or 
damage to another." Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-3(32) (2002). 
IV. Statements of Fact: 
Plaintiff became employed by Salt Lake City as a Police Officer in 1997. (R. at 97-121, 
98). In March 1999, Officer Joseph was involved in an incident wherein he shot and injured a 
motorist while acting under color of authority as a Salt Lake City Police Officer. (R. at 3-12; 4; 
15-20; 16; 99-100). As a result of the shooting incident, Joseph was suspended by Salt Lake 
City as a Police Officer. (R. at 101; 123). In January 2000, SLC reinstated Officer Joseph as 
Police Officer. As part of this reinstatement, Plaintiff was required to submit to a fitness for duty 
evaluation and was ordered to report to Dr. David L. McCann, the defendant. (R. at 6; 102; 125). 
Dr. McCann is a medical doctor and has a specialty in the field of Psychiatry. In January 2000, 
Dr. McCann was retained by SLC in his professional capacity to perform the "fitness for duty" 
mental health examination upon Mr. Joseph. (R. at 86; 128). 
Dr. McCann required Mr. Joseph to sign a contract and then he performed his performed 
his evaluation of Plaintiff on February 3, 2000; it lasted for approximately two (2) hours. (R. at 
128). The first hour plaintiff acted guarded and said little; the second hour, Plaintiff opened up 
and a free conversation exchanged. (R. at 195-96; 394-400). However, Plaintiff disputes that 
Dr. McCann acted impartially or independently contrary to the representations he made in the 
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evaluation and in his contract.2 An expert witness for SLC was never the expressed intention. 
(R. at 125). Plaintiff admits that Dr. McCann reviewed partial employment records and some 
related materials furnished to Dr. McCann by SLC. Dr. McCann also had psychological testing 
done and performed an interview of Plaintiff. (R. at 195; 394). At the time of the fitness for duty 
evaluation, Plaintiff did acknowledge that Dr. McCann's role was to provide his assessment to 
SLC and "not treatment" to Plaintiff. (R. at 128). Dr. McCann completed his report on February 
28, 2000 and provided the same to SLC. (R. at 195; 393). The alleged examination included a 
review of employment and related materials furnished to Dr. McCann by SLC, through Lyn 
Creswell, a Salt Lake City Assistant Attorney. (R. at 195). Dr. McCann also had psychological 
testing done and performed a psychiatric interview of Plaintiff. (R. at 86). At the time of the 
interview, Joseph acknowledged that Dr. McCann's role was to provide his assessment to SLC 
and "not treatment" to Mr. Joseph. (R. at 103-04; 128). Dr. McCann completed his fitness for 
duty report on February 28, 2000 and provided the same to SLC. (R. at 195). See Defendant's 
Exhibit "D," (ATTACHMENT E), referring to Joseph as a "patient." (R. at 128). 
Based upon Dr. McCann's "fitness for duty" report, and McCann's opinion that "Officer 
Joseph [was] not psycholigically suitable to perform the duties of a police officer," hence SLC 
terminated Mr. Joseph as a Police Officer on March 31, 2000. Joseph v. Salt Lake City Civil 
2
 In litigation, Dr. McCann has abandoned the position of acting as an IME arguing in stead 
that he was hired to be an "expert witness" for SLC. R. at 92. The fact is that position is 
controverted by McCann's own exhibits. Defendant's Exhibit "C" is SLC's reinstatement letter 
ordering Mr. Joseph to submit to a "fitness for duty evaluation." Defendant's Exhibit "D" is 
McCann's contract for hire, identifying himself as an ME, identifying Joseph as his "patient," 
professing to conduct himself under the Ethical Guidelines for the Practice of Forensic Psychiatry; 
and admitting by reference to Utah Code Ann. § 78-25-25 (2002) that McCann was a health care 
provider, Joseph was a patient and he intended to provide a copy of Joseph's patient records to SLC. 
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Serv. Comm % 53 P.3d 11 (Utah Ct. App. 2002) (R. at 140). (R. at 9; 17; 86). A copy of Dr. 
McCann's report was provided to Plaintiff and his attorney on or about March 14, 2000. (R. at 
87; 178). Plaintiff and his attorney consulted three Psychologists concerning Dr. McCann's 
report. (R. at 87). Information obtained from these consultations caused Joseph to believe that 
Dr. McCann was "in error" in his evaluation. (R. at 131). On April 5, 2000, Plaintiff, through 
his attorney, appealed his termination by SLC as a Police Officer to the Salt Lake City Civil 
Service Commission. (R. at 130-133). As part of the Request for Appeal, Mr. Joseph contended 
that Dr. McCann was at fault in connection with the fitness for duty evaluation. Plaintiff alleged 
in part as follows: 
Dr. McCann did not conduct a complete and competent evaluation . . . . The evaluation is 
incomplete and inadequate. 
(R. at 130-33; 131). The Salt Lake Civil Service Commission rules require an appeal within 5 
days. As a result, Plaintiff, through his attorney, appealed his termination by SLC and had to 
alleged something, even speculate. (R. at 179). The logical inference is that under pressure of an 
employment appeal, Joseph was speculating; that is not notice. He stated that at the time the 
allegations were raised about Dr. McCann no consultations had taken place. A consultation with 
Dr. Stephen Golding did not take place until after new counsel, Erik Strindberg, was retained on 
October 25, 2000. Mr. Strindberg researched the issue and at his request, between November to 
December 2000 Dr. Golding was consulted. (R. at 114; 179). Another logical inference is that 
Golding could never opine as to intent, just demonstrate negligence at best. 
The only apparent belief at that time due to material omissions from both SLC and Dr. 
McCann was that Dr. McCann's report was negligent in conducting his evaluation. (R. at 168). 
Moreover, due to the material misrepresentation that he was acting as an Independent Medical 
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Examiner and that Joseph was specifically referred to as a "patient" on the same document, 
Plaintiff was led to believe that McCann was or would be acting impartially and never was told 
he was acting as SLC's expert, no pending legal matters suggested a need for a defendant's 
expert. (R. at 128). 
During his civil service appeal, Mr. Joseph failed to comply with discovery requests from 
SLC while his case was pending before the Commission. Accordingly, on April 9, 2001, the 
Commission entered an Order dismissing Plaintiffs appeal of his termination. (R. at 119; 135). 
As this Court is aware from the companion case, Joseph v. Salt Lake Civil Serv, Comm'«, 53 
P.3d 11 (Utah Ct. App. 2002), that order precluded Officer Joseph from a review of the civil 
service appeal on the merits. The action of SLC in terminating Plaintiff as a Police Officer and 
the Commission in dismissing Plaintiffs appeal of that termination was affirmed by the Utah 
Court of Appeals in Joseph v. Salt Lake Civil Serv. Comm 'n, 53 P.3d 11 (Utah Ct. App. 2002). 
(R. at 140) (R. at 120-21; 138) 
On April 23, 2003, Mr. Joseph initiated his claim against Dr. McCann for medical 
malpractice by filing a Notice of Intent to Commence Legal Action and contemporaneously filing 
a Request for Prelitigation Screening Panel with the State of Utah, Division of Occupational and 
Professional Licensing. These papers were served and filed in accordance with the provisions of 
the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act, § 78-14-1 et seq. (R. at 88; 179; 198-200). 
The April 23, 2003 Notice of Intent to Commence Legal Action was Plaintiffs third 
attempt to comply with the provisions of the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act, § 78-14-1 et seq. 
Prior to this action, Plaintiffs counsel missed the filing deadline for the first Request for 
Prelitigation Review for the September 23, 2002 notice; the second Request for Prelitigation 
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Review for the February 9, 2003 notice was somehow lost during DOPL's reconstruction and 
move from the third floor of the Heber Wells Building to the first floor. Therefore, a third notice 
and contemporaneous filing was conducted on April 23, 2003. (R. at 198-200). 
Following, Mr. Joseph filed his complaint on October 14, 2003, and Dr. McCann 
answered on November 14, 2003. Then on January 25, 2004, during discovery, Joseph received 
for the first time, the "CONFIDENTIAL" Lyn Creswell letter from SLC, along with other 
materials from his patient records not otherwise previously disclosed to him.3 That was first 
notification and disputable evidence of McCann's fraudulent involvement to fire Mr. Joseph 
from the police force - that he had acted as an agent for SLC. At no time during Mr. Joseph's 
alleged IME by Dr. McCann nor following was Mr. Joseph apprized of the letter's existence. 
Even Dr. McCann's February 28, 2000 report failed to disclose the existence of letters having 
been submitted or relied on. (R. at 195). And even though Plaintiff has been involved in for five 
separate legal actions with SLC, SLC has never revealed it to Plaintiff and likely never would. 
(R. at 177; 193). 
3
 Dr. McCann's Exhibit "D" - his contract for the fitness for duty evaluation and patient 
consent form references Utah Code Ann. § 78-25-25 (as amended) which identifies whether 
expressed or implied that McCann was a Joseph's health care provider, Joseph was his patient, and 
that McCann intended to provide a copy of his "patient's records" to SLC. 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 
Issue One: Defendant McCann Owed Plaintiff Joseph a Duty Under UHCMA. 
In this matter, Dr. McCann's own evidence, and particularly his Exhibit "D" establishes 
that Dr. McCann owed Joseph a duty to be fair and impartial as any other practicing physician 
providing care or services to his patient. In this matter, the doctor under contract was hired by 
SLC to perform a fitness for duty evaluation upon Officer Joseph, one of SLC's employees. On 
February 3, 2000, Officer Joseph signed Dr. McCann's contract and consent form. The contract 
expressly and impliedly represented that, one, Plaintiff was McCann's "patient," he was not 
evaluated for purposes of "treatment," but was being evaluated for "fitness for duty." The 
service provided was similar to that of other practicing physicians and psychiatrists performing 
Forsenic Psychiatry. That contract and consent agreement also by reference to Section 78-25-25, 
Dr. McCann admits being a "health care provider" and that he needed Joseph's, McCann's 
patient, consent to release a copy of the "patient's records" to SLC. 
As a matter of law, the definitions of both "patient" and "health care provider" are 
synonymous in Section 78-25-25 and 78-14-3. As a matter of fact, 78-25-25, specifically cites to 
the definition of health care provider on 78-14-3. Based upon the totality of the circumstances, 
Plaintiff was believing Dr. McCann owed him a duty under UHCMA. 
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Issue Two: Defendant McCann Waived Statute of Limitations as an Affirmative Defense, 
Defendant moved for summary judgment claiming that more than two years had passed 
from the time Mr. Joseph had notice of Dr. McCann's "error." However, that claim of error was 
not adequate notice that a reasonable person can be held to under the circumstances where as 
here the Plaintiff was defrauded unknowingly by the Defendant health care provider. 
In this matter, the Plaintiff was not apprized of his recoverable injuries or the origins of 
the tort committed by Dr. McCann. The discovery of Dr. McCann's agency or "expert witness" 
status was not made known to him until after litigation commenced. The complaint was filed on 
October 14, 2003, the discovery that Joseph had been defrauded by McCann was not disclosed to 
him until January 25, 2004. The motion for summary judgment was not sought until June 7, 
2004. The motion was not timely pursued an effectuated constituted a waiver of the defense. By 
that time, Defendant's tort violation of UHCMA was discovered and Joseph's cause of action 
survives under Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-4(l)(b). 
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ARGUMENTS 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS IMPROPER IN THIS MATTER 
POINT ONE. THE EVIDENCE, CONTEXT OF THE TOTALITY OF THE 
CIRCUMSTANCES, AND THE LOGICAL INFERENCES FROM THE EVIDENCE 
DICTATE THAT DR. McCANN, AN ADMITTED HEALTH CARE PROVIDER OWED 
JOSEPH A DUTY UNDER THE U.H.C.M.A. BECAUSE JOSEPH WAS HIS PATIENT, 
ACTED UNDER CONTRACT AND PERFORMED A PSYCHIATRIC SERVICE 
CONCERNING HIS FITNESS SIMILAR TO THAT OF OTHER HEALTH CARE 
PROVIDERS. 
Summary judgment is appropriate "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to 
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to summary judgment 
as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). The moving party bears the initial burden of 
informing the court of the basis for its motion for summary judgment. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 
All U.S. 317, 323, 91 L. Ed. 2d 265, 106 S. Ct. 2548 (1986). If the nonmoving party then fails 
to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of the case to which it bears the burden of 
proof at trial, the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id. at 323. In 
considering summary judgment the trial court does not weigh the evidence and determine 
the truth of the matter. Rather, the court inquires whether a reasonable jury, faced with 
the evidence presented, could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Anderson v. Liberty 
Lobby, Inc., All U.S. 242, 249, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202, 106 S. Ct. 2505 (1986). (emphasis added). In 
this matter, the parties are not in agreement with the claimed undisputed facts. And the 
conclusions of law were incorrectly drawn from the facts presented. 
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This Court should review for correctness, the trial judge's decision concerning both 
issues before this Court, to wit: (1) Whether Dr. McCann breached his duties as a health care 
provider owed to Robert Joseph under the UHCMA, and (2) Whether Dr. McCann waived his 
statute of limitations defense, having disclosed during litigation that he acted fraudulently by 
concealing the true nature of his fitness for duty evaluation.4 Under the circumstances, it 
clearly appears Mr. Joseph didn't discovery the doctor's fraud with the city until after his 
malpractice action against Dr. McCann commenced. The Defendant's motion for summary 
was certainly untimely and he waived the opportunity to dismiss the action at the outset. 
Meanwhile, Plaintiff's claim for negligence can be barred. Honestly, Plaintiff would not and 
could not have it both ways. Either the act or omission of the doctor was willful and deliberate 
or it was mistaken. As of January 25, 2004, Plaintiff having discovered the origins of the 
doctors malpractice on January 25, 2004, it finally became a clear to Plaintiff that the origins 
of Dr. McCann's fraudulent report claiming he was unfit for duty was his part in the scheme 
initiated by the City to discharge him. McCann apparently believed he was free to enterprise 
with the city because as he thought he would be immune from prosecution under the theory of 
"no duty" because he was a "expert witness." (R. at 92). However, his arguments must fail 
because a duty is admitted by his contract and consent he had Mr. Joseph sign on February 3, 
2000. (R. at 128). 
4
 On February 3,2000, Plaintiff was expressly and impliedly led to believe that (1) Plaintiff 
was Defendant's patient, that he was acting ethically while performing Forensic Psychiatry services 
concerning Joseph's fitness for duty as a police officer, and that he was an "Independent Medical" 
Examiner. (R. at 128) Disclosed during this litigation without foreknowledge, Dr. McCann 
professes his true role was as SLC's expert witness. (R. at 92). 
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POINT TWO. THE COURTS HAVE BOTH ADDRESSED THE LEGISLATIVE 
INTENT OF THE "WITHIN TWO, BUT NOT MORE THAN FOUR" LANGUAGE OF 
SECTION 78-14-4(1) WITH DIFFERENT RESULTS. 
In this matter, Robert Joseph is entitled to a reversal of the statute of limitations claim. 
As for the "no duty" issue that question can be reversed too as that is a question proper for the 
jury in light of fraudulent concealment. In Bank One Utah N.A. v. West Jordan City, 54 P.3d 135 
(Utah Ct. App. 2002), surprisingly, a products liability case, offers clarification and direction for 
this Court to follow concerning statute of limitations issues in malpractice actions. The Court 
reasoned: 
As a general matter, "'"where statutory language is plain and unambiguous, this Court 
will not look beyond the same to divine legislative intent. Rather, we are guided by the 
rule that a statute should generally be construed according to its plain language."'" 
Sorenson Ranch School v. Oram, 2001 UT App 354, f 8, 36 P.3d 528 (citations omitted). 
Therefore, the particular language used in a statute setting a limitation period has proved 
critical to proper interpretation of the statute. See McDougal v. Weed, 945 P.2d 175, 177 
& IL 1 (Utah Ct. App. 1997); Aragon, 857 P.2d at 252-53. 
In McDougal, we interpreted the language of the Utah Healthcare Malpractice Act, Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-14-4 (1996), which provided in relevant part as follows: 
No malpractice action against a health care provider may be brought unless it is 
commenced within two years after the plaintiff or patient discovers, or through the 
use of reasonable diligence should have discovered the injury, whichever first 
occurs, but not to exceed four years after the date of the alleged act, omission, 
neglect or occurrence.... 
McDougal, 945 P.2d at 176-77 (quoting Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-4 (1996)) (emphasis in 
original). At issue in that case was whether the "statute of limitations [was] tolled until 
the time the plaintiff discovered], or through the use of reasonable diligence should have 
discovered, both the existence of the recoverable injury and the defendant's identity." Id. 
at 176 (emphasis in original). We concluded that section 78-14-4 did "not require that the 
statute of limitations be tolled until the identity of the tortfeasor [had been] discovered or 
should have been discovered." Id. at 177. This was because "the [relevant] statutory 
language clearly set[ ] the moment the 'patient discovers ... the injury' as the triggering 
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moment for the limitations period." Id. (quoting Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-4(1) (1996)) 
(emphasis added). Thus, by its plain language, the statute made clear that identifying the 
party responsible for the injury was not a prerequisite to the limitation period beginning to 
run. 
Id. In this matter, Mr. Joseph claims that the defendant deliberately concealed the origins of his 
malpractice - a material omission is just as fraudulent as a misrepresentation. The trial court in 
this matter, has ruled consistent with McDougal However, the Utah Supreme Court in Jensen v. 
IHCHospitals, Inc., 944 P.2d 327 (Utah 1997) seems to agree with Mr. Joseph on this issue that 
fraudulent concealment can toll the statute of limitations period. The Court concluded: 
In conclusion, we hold that Shelly's family's wrongful death claims are governed by the 
two-year statute of limitations for medical malpractice actions contained in section 78-14-
4 of the Utah Code. We further conclude that the limitations period starts running when 
the patient or plaintiff discovers, or through the exercise of due diligence should have 
discovered, the underlying injury and its origins in medical malpractice. 
Id., at 337. That opinion appears to dynamically oppose McDougal and arguably is precedential. 
Clearly in this light, in light of Jensen it would appear Mr. Joseph's claims should be remanded 
for this Court to determine whether Mr. Joseph's was entitled to present his claim for factual 
findings whether fraudulent concealment was involved and sufficiently tolled the claim. In this 
matter, there is enough facts present before the court for this court to decide no whether 
fraudulent concealment was involved.5 Moreover, pursuant to Liberty Lobby , the trial court 
5
 McCann's Exhibit "D" identified to Joseph on February 3,2000 that he was performing a 
fitness for duty evaluation on Joseph at the city's request, that Joseph was his patient and needed 
Joseph's consent to release a copy of the evaluation report to SLC, and that he would conduct 
himself ethically according to the Ethical Guidelines for the Practice of Forensic Psychiatry. (R. at 
128). Nothing was mentioned that he was a servant of the SLC and that he was acting as an "expert 
witness" for the city until litigation and the filing of the motion for summary judgment on July 7, 
2004. R. at 82; 92). Also, Dr. McCann assisted in the material concealment of "CONFIDENTIAL" 
material that would have suggested his role otherwise than what was represented to him on February 
3, 2000. Not until discovery did McCann disclose Lyn Creswell's "Confidential" letter. That 
disclosure occurred on January 25,2004 - well after litigation commenced but within four years of 
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should have determined that a jury could find in Mr. Joseph's favor. In this matter it is clear 
from a review of Dr. McCann's original evaluation that a concealment of the origins of the 
doctor's malpractice was present. Here, the original evaluation failed to identify the 
"confidential" letter from Salt Lake City Attorney Lyn Creswell Certainly had that fact been 
disclosed by its timely disclosure on the report of materials considered, Mr. Joseph (1) could 
have addressed it and defended it at that time with the doctor or his employer, Salt Lake City 
before being discharged; (2) it would have been addressed at the time of his appeal to Civil 
Service; (3) it would have been discussed on appellate review to the Court of Appeals; (4) it 
would have been included in either petitions for certiorari with either Supreme Courts. None of 
those things occurred. Interestingly, what is also obvious was that neither the City nor Dr. 
McCann ever disclosed it to Mr. Joseph. The only one who eventually did was Dr. McCann, but 
only during the course of this lawsuit. The other disclosure made aware to Joseph during 
litigation was the fact that Dr. McCann did not act as Joseph's health care provider for purposes 
of the UHCMA. Rather, McCann alleged for the first time in litigation that he was a "expert 
witness" for SLC and owed no duty to Joseph whatsoever. (R. at 92). 
Because of McCann's non-disclosures by both Dr. McCann and the City that is prima 
facie evidence of a conspiracy to conceal the fact from Mr. Joseph. A reasonable jury can find in 
Robert Joseph's favor against McCann. Joseph's position is that both false representations and 
material omissions were made by Dr. McCann. Material omissions are the same as false 
misrepresentation. A finding of fraud must be based on the existence of all its essential elements, 
i. e., the making of false representation concerning a presently existing material fact which 
February 3, 2000. (R. at 195; T. at 15-16). 
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represent or either knew to be false or made recklessly without sufficient knowledge, or the 
omission of material fact when there is a duty to disclose, for the purpose of inducing action on 
part of the other party, with actual, justifiable reliance resulting in damage to that party; fraud 
must be shown by clear and convincing proof and will not lie in mere suspicion or innuendo. 
See, Taylor v. Gasor, Inc., 607 P.2d 293 (Utah 1980); also see, Farmers' & Merchants' Sav. 
Bankv. Jensen, 64 Utah 609, 232 P. 1084, 1087 (Utah 1924) ("Fraud is any act, concealment, or 
omission used to cheat or deceive another."). 
In this matter, it is clearly a disputed fact whether Dr. McCann deceived Mr. Joseph. The 
deception acted as both a basis for liability under the UHCMA and lor tolling of the statute of 
limitations under the UHCMA, pursuant to section 78-14-4(l)(b). That section reads, in 
pertinent part: 
a)..-. 
(b) In an action where it is alleged that a patient6 has been prevented from 
discovering misconduct ob the part of a health care provider7 BECAUSE that health care 
provider has affirmatively acted to fraudulently conceal the alleged misconduct, the claim 
shall be barred unless commenced within one year after the plaintiff or patient discovers, 
or through the use of reasonable diligence, should have discovered the fraudulent 
concealment, whichever first occurs. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-4 (2005). In this matter ,as stated above, Defendant did affirmatively 
act to conceal the true nature of his retention by the City to act as its "expert witness," contrary to 
his representation that Joseph was a "patient" of his and that he would be independent and ethical 
6
 It is an undisputed fact that McCann represented to Joseph, Joseph was McCann's 
"patient." (R. at 128). (ATTACHMENT E) 
7
 It is an undisputed fact that McCann held himself out to Joseph expressly and impliedly 
by reference to Utah Code Ann. § 78-25-25, to be Joseph's health care provider in the same contract 
and consent. (R. at 128). (ATTACHMENT E) 
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(yielding to the guidelines of the profession for conduct forensic psychiatry). (R. at 128). 
(ATTACHMENT E). In addition, the doctor did not reveal, discuss or otherwise disclose the 
existence of "CONFIDENTIAL" letters from Lyn Creswell. (R. at 193). Clearly, as a matter of 
law, Joseph is entitled to a remand and should be allowed to proceed to trial. In considering 
summary judgment the court does not weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the 
matter. Rather, this court should inquires whether a reasonable jury, faced with the 
evidence presented, a jury could return a verdict for Robert Joseph. See Anderson v. 
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202, 106 S. Ct 2505 (1986). 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, summary judgment should be reversed and the matter 
remanded consistent with the points raised in this brief. The Defendant, David L. McCann, 
M.D., F.A.P.A., by his own contract and consent form and admissions expressed and implied 
therein that he was a health care provider subject to Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-25-25, and 78-14-3. 
Also, by further admission, Mr. Joseph was McCann's "patient" expressly so stated in 
Defendant's Exhibit "D." (ATTACHMENT E). 
Also, because of Dr. McCann's actions concealing the true nature of his employ-that he 
was retained by SLC to service as SLC's "expert witness" rather than conduct himself 
independently and impartially as he suggested in the Defendant's Exhibit "D." (ATTACHMENT 
E) He also affirmatively concealed "confidential" material from Lyn Creswell that would have 
provided Joseph reasonable notice that he was acting tortuous and that for the purpose of the 
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statute of limitations in Section 78-14-4 was on notice that to commence litigation within two 
years of the evaluation's report, dated February 28, 2000. Plaintiff commencement of litigation 
when he did was deservingly justified and reasonable under the circumstances. Pursuant to 
Section 78-14-4(l)(b), the statute of limitations was tolled through Dr. McCann's concealments. 
Because Mr. Joseph discovered the nature of his tort during litigation, the statute of limitation is 
not an issue. The discovery of Dr. McCann's concealment of the Lyn Creswell letter occurred on 
January 25, 2004. The discovery of Dr. McCann's true employment to act as the City's "expert 
witness" was not until July 7, 2004. The lawsuit at hand was commenced on October 14, 2003 
upon notice of intent to commence being perfected on April 23, 2003 (after previous defective 
attempts). 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
ROBERT L JOSEPH, an individual, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DAVID L McCANN, M.D., F.A.P.A., 
an individual, 
Defendant. 
ORDER OF DISMISSAL 
WITH PREJUDICE 
Civil No. 030922636 
Judge Judith S. Atherton 
The Motion for Summary Judgment of the Defendant, David L. McCann, M.D. came 
on for hearing before the Court on January 27, 2004. Plaintiff, Robert L. Joseph was 
represented by his attorney, D. Bruce Oliver; and the Defendant, David L. McCann, M.D. 
was represented by his attorney, J. Anthony Eyre. The Court having considered the record 
of the case, including the Memoranda of the parties; having heard oral argument from 
*?L~—h^-> *~-y 
counsel; being fully advised in the premises; and, having stated in open Court the decision 
of the Court: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED as follows: 
The Motion for Summary Judgment of Defendant David L McCann, M.D. is granted 
and Plaintiffs action against him is dismissed with prejudice on the following alternative 
grounds: 
(a) Defendant David L. McCann, M.D. owed no legal duty to Plaintiff from 
which a legal action could be commenced; and, 
(b) The claim of Plaintiff against Defendant, David L. McCann, M.D. is 
barred by the two-year statute of limitations contained in § 78-14-4, U.C.A. 
DATED this 35* day of _ pl^lA*-^ , 2005. 
BY THE COURT: 
JUDITH S. ATHERTON 
District Court Judge 
/Uc^J /B^^J^^ fjgfj fr 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
/C? /&<*UJL-C(ILS 
D. BRUCE OLIVER 




FILED DISTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
SEP27 2005 
SALT LAKE COUNT^QryO 
Deputy Clerk 
I N THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
1 ^ M5& fOR SMiS IA3& COUNTY, ST&SS 0 ¥ UTAH. 
ROBERT L . JOSEPH, an i n d i v i d u a l , : MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER 
P l a i n t i f f , * CASE NO. 0 3 0 9 2 2 6 3 6 
v s . : 
DAVID L. McCANN, M.D. , F.A.P-A-, : 
an individual, 
Defendant. 
This matter is before the Court on plaintiff's Motion to Alter or 
Amend Judgment. On January 27, 2005, this Court granted defendant's 
Motion for Summary Judgment against plaintiff and dismissed plaintiff's 
Complaint with prejudice. At that time, this Court found that the 
statute of limitations had run. In his Motion to Alter or Amend 
Judgment, plaintiff otfce again argues the issue of the running of the 
statute of limitation^. Plaintiff raises no new issues regarding the 
statute of limitation^ in his Motion to Alter or Amend, nor does he 
allege any legal erxcrt - 5te ^ i^pl^ B^eks *LO \ra^ e \ivis CoMxt, ^ c^ eo^ si,d%x 
its ruling. This Court finds no basis to do so. 
Therefore, plaintiff's Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment is denied. 
Dated this / 5 _day of 
ATTACHMENT C 
JOSEPH v. SALT LAKJ 
Cite as 53 P.3d 1 
court's denial of Ms. Nunez's motion to 
amend and remand for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion. 
1138 I CONCUR: JAMES Z. DAVIS, 
•Judge. 
ORME, Judge (concurring specially): 
11 39 I concur in the court's opinion, but 
wish to register a concern. 
H 40 In the procedural posture of this case. 
Dr. Albo was entitled to summary judgment 
with respect to his individual liability. The 
very reason he is off the hook personally—he 
demonstrated in moving for summary judg-
ment that anything he did, he did in the 
course and scope of his employment as an 
employee of the University—seals the re-
sponsibility of the University to answer for 
any negligence in the course of Dr. Albo's 
treatment of Plaintiff. 
1141 That having been said, it should be 
noted that it would not have been at all clear 
to Plaintiff that Dr. Albo was rendering 
treatment to her as a University employee. 
She visited him not at the University Hospi-
tal or any of the ancillary buildings, but at a 
private office off campus, adjacent to Salt 
Lake Regional Hospital—a hospital at which 
Dr. Albo also had privileges, a hospital which 
covered the larger portion of his secretary's 
salary, and a hospital at which many of his 
patient records were kept. Neither Univer-
sity medical students nor University Hospital 
interns or residents observed or participated 
in any of the procedures performed by Dr. 
Albo on Plaintiff. The sclerosing agent used 
by Dr. Albo was not secured from the sup-
plies of University Hospital, but rather was 
procured in Italy by his daughter. (Appar-
ently the sclerosing agent has not been ap-
proved for use in this country by the Food 
and Drug Administration.) 
1142 While it is clear given the record in 
this case that Dr. Albo was in fact a Univer-
sity employee who treated Plaintiff in the 
course of that employment as it was broadly 
defined by the University, it is also clear this 
would have come as a surprise to Plaintiff. 
Indeed, it is almost as though Dr. Albo 
and/or the University preferred that his sta-
tus not come to Plaintiffs attention until long 
2 CITY CIVIL SERVICE Utah \ \ 
\ (UtahApp. 2002) 
after she had been treated. Perhaps clear, 
unambiguous, and early disclosure that a 
treating physician enjoys the protection of 
the Utah Governmental Immunity Act is not 
good for business. 
H 43 Surely courts will look askance, as we 
have done here, at any effort to obscure the 
University's role if that effort is coupled with 
a later attempt to avoid responsibility alto-
gether. Such a strategy runs something like 
this: You cannot hold the doctor personally 
liable because he is an employee of the Uni-
versity and did this work in the course of 
that employment. And you cannot hold the 
University responsible because your notice of 
claim was directed to the doctor rather than 
the University. Moreover, it is inconsequen-
tial that we wanted him to seem like any ol' 
doctor in private practice rather than a Uni-
versity professor or state employee so that 
you would not worry too much about the 
remedies available to you in the event of 
malpractice and thus are largely responsible 
for your focusing on him initially rather than 
the University. 
11 44 The main opinion's scholarly and well-
reasoned discussion about the adequacy of 
the notice of claim and the "relation back" 
doctrine avoids this inequitable result by per-
mitting Plaintiff to amend her complaint and 
proceed against the University as Dr. Albo's 
employer. 
2002 UT App 254 
Robert L. JOSEPH, Petitioner, 
v. 
SALT LAKE CITY CIVIL SERVICE 
COMMISSION, Salt Lake City Corpora-
tion, Salt Lake City Police Department, 
and the Chief of Police, Respondents, 
No. 20010399-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
July 26, 2002. 
Former police officer appealed from or-
der of the city civil service commission dis-
\-t&> 
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missing administrative appeal of his termi-
nation following officer's failure to comply 
with city's discovery requirements. The 
Court of Appeals, Thorne, J., held that dis-
missal of officer's appeal for failure to comply 
with discovery requirements did not violate 
officer's due process right to a post-depriva-
tion hearing, even in absence of a formal 
discovery order. 
Affirmed. 
1. Administrative Law and Procedure 
<s=>758 
Court of Appeals will reverse an adjudi-
cative body's decision to levy discovery sanc-
tions only in the face of a clear abuse of 
discretion. 
2. Appeal and Error <s=23 
While the Court of Appeals is generally 
limited in its authority to address issues sua 
sponte, when the issue is jurisdictional the 
Court is under no such limitation. 
3. Courts <e=>248 
In the absence of a specific statute 
granting the Court of Appeals jurisdiction 
over subject matter, it has no jurisdiction, 
4. Municipal Corporations <s=>185fl2) 
Court of Appeals had jurisdiction to re-
view finding of city civil service commission 
denying former police officer's motion to 
strike its order of dismissal of officer's appeal 
of his termination, given express grant of 
jurisdiction to the Court for specific purpose 
of reviewing decisions made by municipal 
commissions. U.C.A.1953 § 10-3-1012.5 
(1999). 
5. Constitutional Law <S=>278.4(5) 
Post-deprivation procedures implement-
ed by civil service commission for failure to 
comply with discovery, while not constitution-
ally guaranteed, must comport with due pro-
cess requirements providing for a fair hear-
ing. U.S.CA ConstAmend. 14. 
6. Constitutional Law <§=>251.6 
The fundamental requirement of due 
process is the opportunity to be heard, at a 
meaningful time and in a meaningful manner, 
and, when this opportunity is granted a com-
plainant, who chooses not to exercise it, that 
complainant cannot later plead a denial of 
procedural due process. U.S.CA. Const. 
Amend. 14. 
7. Administrative Law and Procedure 
<s=>311 
While local administrative bodies are not 
strictly bound by the formal rules of evidence 
and procedure, absent any contrary di-
rection, certain rules, including the rules gov-
erning discovery, are clearly applicable to 
such proceedings. Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 
81(a). 
8. Administrative Law and Procedure 
<s=>466 
When an administrative agency deter-
mines that a party has not complied with 
legitimate discovery requests due to willful-
ness, bad faith, fault, or persistent dilatory 
tactics frustrating the judicial process, the 
agency acts within its discretion in imposing 
sanctions. 
9. Administrative Law and Procedure 
<S=>466 
The choice of an appropriate discovery 
sanction including the entry of default 
against the noncomplying party is primarily 
the responsibility of an administrative agen-
cy. 
10. Constitutional Law <s=>278.4(5) 
Municipal Corporations <&=>185(12) 
Dismissal of former police officer's ap-
peal of his employment termination for fail-
ure to comply with discovery requirements 
did not violate officer's due process right to a 
post-deprivation hearing before city civil ser-
vice commission; officer not only ignored at 
least seven requests from the city over the 
course of ten months, and admitted fault in 
failing to produce the requested material but, 
thereafter, failed to avail himself of one final 
opportunity to comply with city's request for 
the documents. U.S.CA. ConstAmend. 14. 
11. Municipal Corporations <s=>185(8) 
While a terminated municipal employee 
has a statutory right to a post-deprivation 
hearing, that right, absent contrary rules 
adopted by the civil service commission, is 
tempered by the employee's duty to comply 
1 —-> f^t 
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with, or at the very least respond to, a prop-
erly issued discovery request, and should the 
servant fail in that duty, and the commission 
determine that the failure was the product of 
willfulness, bad faith, fault, or persistent dila-
tory tactics, the commission may, at its dis-
cretion, levy sanctions for the failure, includ-
ing dismissal U.C.A.1953 § 10-3-1012 
(1999). 
12. Municipal Corporations <s=>185(12) 
Absence of a formal discovery order did 
not preclude city civil service commission 
irom dismissing former police officers' appeal 
of his employment termination for failure to 
eomply with discovery requirements, where 
there was no contention that city failed to 
properly serve officer with any of its discov-
ery requests, officer voluntarily entered into 
ii stipulation wherein he admitted fault in 
failing to respond to city's discovery re-
quests, and acknowledged that additional 
failure to respond would result in renewal of 
city's dismissal motion, but officer was aware 
that commission adopted the stipulation and 
entered additional order dismissing officer's 
appeal should he fail to timely produce re-
quested discovery items. 
Vh Administrative Law and Procedure 
<s=>466 
An administrative agency is not required 
to issue an order compelling discovery prior 
to considering sanctions; it is enough that a 
notice of the taking of a deposition or a 
request for inspection has been properly 
served on the party. 
14. Administrative Law and Procedure 
<S=>513 
Although parties deserve the opportuni-
ty to be heard, dismissal of an appeal before 
an administrative agency is appropriate when 
JI party pursues a claim in a manner that 
abuses opportunity to respond to properly 
nerved notice of the taking of a deposition or 
u request for inspection. 
15. Municipal Corporations @=>185(12) 
Former police officer's claims that penal-
ty of dismissal of appeal of his employment 
termination was disproportionate to his fail-
ure to comply with discovery requests, that 
the city civil service commission failed to 
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consider any other reasonable sanction, that 
the discovery material requested by city was 
irrelevant, and that commission's reliance on 
advice of city attorney created a conflict of 
interest, were waived, where officer failed to 
raise issues with the commission. 
Robert L. Joseph, Sandy, Petitioner Pro 
Se. 
Martha S. Stonebrook, Salt Lake City Law 
Department, Salt Lake City, for Respon-
dents. 
Before Judges BILLINGS, 
GREENWOOD, and THORNE. 
OPINION 
THORNE, Judge: 
H 1 Robert L. Joseph appeals from an or-
der of the Salt Lake City Civil Service Com-
mission (the Commission) dismissing his ad-
ministrative appeal following his repeated 
failure to comply with discovery require-
ments. We affirm. 
BACKGROUND 
U 2 In March of 1999, Joseph was involved 
in an incident that resulted in the Salt Lake 
City Police Department (the City) determin-
ing that he had acted unprofessionally and 
had violated the City's deadly force policy. 
While this finding was later affirmed by the 
Commission, Joseph was permitted to contin-
ue his employment pending the results of a 
fitness for duty examination. Thus, Joseph 
was examined by Dr. David McCann, who, in 
March of 2000, submitted to the City the 
following conclusions regarding Joseph: 
[He] has Disordered Personality Traits 
which have contributed to him placing him-
self in jeopardy in the shooting incident 
and in other incidents. Officer Joseph's 
personality traits have caused him to be 
excessively self-centered and unwilling to 
learn from peers or superiors. His per-
sonality traits are likely to lead him to 
increased isolation and alienation from ap-
propriate professional supervision and the 
needs of the citizens of Salt Lake City. 
Personality traits similar to those of Offi-
\ (JA 
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cer Joseph's are notably resistant to psy-
chotherapeutic intervention, additional 
training, closer supervision or disciplinary 
action. His personality traits cause an 
increased risk for harm to himself, to other 
officers and to the citizens of Salt Lake 
City. In [Dr. McCann's] opinion, Officer 
Joseph is not psychologically suitable to 
perform the duties of a police officer. 
Based at least in part on this evaluation, on 
March 31, 2000, the City's Chief of Police, 
Mac Connole, terminated Joseph's employ-
ment. Joseph appealed the City's decision to 
terminate his employment to the Commis-
sion. 
U 3 Soon after learning of the appeal, the 
City requested certain documents and mate-
rials known or suspected to be in Joseph's 
possession. Joseph, however, neither prof-
fered the requested discovery materials nor 
did he petition the Commission for protection 
from the request. Over the course of the 
next ten months, the City repeatedly re-
newed its request, which Joseph ignored on 
every occasion. Frustrated with Joseph's re-
fusal to cooperate, the City filed a motion to 
dismiss as a sanction for Joseph's inaction. 
This finally roused Joseph to act. j 
114 To stave off possible dismissal, Joseph, 
through counsel, entered into a stipulation 
with the City. Joseph agreed to supply all of 
the requested material within fifteen days or 
face renewal of the dismissal motion, likely 
ending his appeal. Following a hearing on 
the proposed agreement, the Commission 
adopted the stipulation and specifically in-
formed Joseph's attorney that failure to com-
ply with the clear terms of the agreement 
would result in his appeal being dismissed 
with prejudice. Nonetheless, Joseph failed 
to timely produce the requested material, 
thereby violating the terms of the stipulation. 
115 The City subsequently renewed its re-
quest for dismissal, which the Commission 
readily granted on April 9, 2001. Then, after 
a hearing on Joseph's motion to strike the 
order of dismissal, the Commission found 
that Joseph had presented no good cause to 
explain his failure to comply with the terms 
of the stipulation and denied his motion. Jo-
seph now appeals. 
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
116 While Joseph submits several argu-
ments for our review7, only one is properly 
before this court. 
[1] U 7 Joseph argues that the Commis-
sion erred in dismissing his appeal as a dis-
covery sanction. We will reverse an adjudi-
cative body's decision to levy discovery 
sanctions only in the face of a clear abuse 
of discretion. See Hales v. Oldroyd, 2000 
UT App 75,1115, 999 R2d 58S. 
ANALYSIS 
[2,3] 118 Prior to addressing Joseph's 
claim, we must first determine whether this 
court is properly vested with jurisdiction 
over his claim. While we are generally limit-
ed in our authority to address issues sua 
sponte, see In re R.NJ., 908 P.2d 345, 347 
(Utah Ct.App.1995) ("if a [party] has not 
raised an issue on appeal, we may not consid-
er the issue sua sponte" (quoting State v. 
Rodriguez, 841 P.2d 1228, 1229 (Utah Ct. 
App.1992)) (alteration in original)), when the 
issue is jurisdictional we are under no such 
limitation. See id. "[T]he jurisdiction of the 
Court of Appeals . . . must be provided by 
statute." DeBry v. Salt Lake County, 764 
P.2d 627, 627 (Utah Ct.App.1988) (citing 
Utah Const, art. VIII, § 5). In the absence 
of a specific statute granting this court juris-
diction over the subject matter, we have no 
jurisdiction. See Barney v. Division of Oc-
cupational & Prof I Licensing, 828 P.2d 542, 
543-44 (Utah CtApp.1992); DeBry, 764 P.2d 
at 628. 
[4] H 9 Here, were we restricted to the 
jurisdictional boundaries found in Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(b)(i) (Supp.2001) (granting 
this court jurisdiction over appeals from the 
district court's review of "adjudicative pro-
ceedings of agencies of political subdivisions 
of the state or other local agencies"), we 
would not have jurisdiction and would be 
forced to dismiss the petition. See Barney, 
828 P.2d at 544. However, Utah Code Ann. 
§ 10-^ 3-1012.5 (1999) provides an express 
grant of jurisdiction to this court for the 
specific purpose of reviewing decisions made 
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by municipal commissions.1 Therefore, be-
cause the Legislature has provided a specific 
ntatute granting this court jurisdiction, we 
conclude that we have jurisdiction and ad-
dress Joseph's claim on appeal. 
15-7] 1110 Joseph first argues that the 
discovery sanction levied by the Commission 
violates his due process right to a full hear-
ing before the Commission. "Post-depriva-
tion procedures, while not constitutionally 
guaranteed, must comport with due process 
requirements providing for a fair hearing." 
IAICOS v. Murray City Civil Serv. Comm'n. 
1*49 P.2d 746, 753 (Utah CtApp.1997). 
" The fundamental requirement of due pro-
cess is the opportunity to be heard, at a 
meaningful time and in a meaningful manner, 
and, when this opportunity is granted a com-
plainant, who chooses not to exercise it, that 
complainant cannot later plead a denial of 
procedural due process.''1' Utah Dept of 
Trans, v. Osguthorpe, 892 P.2d 4, 8 (Utah 
J 995) (citation omitted). Moreover, while lo-
cal administrative bodies are not strictly 
bound by the formal rules of evidence and 
procedure, see Lucas, 949 P.2d at 755, absent 
any contrary direction, certain rules, includ-
ing the rules^overning discovery, are clearly 
applicable to such proceedings. See Utah R. 
Civ. P. 81(a). 
18,9] 1111 When an administrative agen-
cy determines that a party has not complied 
with legitimate discovery requests due to 
" Svillfulness, bad faith, . . . fault, or persis-
tent dilatory tactics frustrating the judicial 
process/ " the agency acts within its discre-
tion in imposing sanctions. Hales v. Ol-
droyd, 2000 UT App 75,H 16, 999 P.2d 588 
(citation omitted). " '[T]he choice of an ap-
propriate discovery sanction [including the 
rntry of default against the noncomplying 
party] is primarily the responsibility of the 
I agency]/" and "we have long held that we 
will not interfere [with this choice] unless 
' "abuse of that discretion [is] clearly 
Known." '" Morton v. Continental Baking 
Co., 938 P2d 271, 274 (Utah 1997) (citations 
omitted) (fifth alteration in original). 
1. We note that while Utah Code Ann § 10—3-
1012.5 (1999) is titled "Appeal to district c o u r t -
Scope of review/' its plain language vests juris-
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[10,11] 1112 Joseph argues that the 
meaning behind "the opportunity to be 
heard, at a meaningful time and in a mean-
ingful manner," Osguthorpe, 892 P.2d at 8, in 
this context, immunizes him from dismissal, 
regardless of his conduct. He is incorrect. 
While we agree that Joseph has a statutory 
right to a post-deprivation hearing, see Utah 
Code Ann. § 10-3-1012 (1999); Lucas, 949 
P.2d at 753, this right, absent contrary rules 
adopted by the Commission, is tempered by 
the petitioner's duty to comply with, or at the 
very least respond to, a properly issued dis-
covery request. Should the petitioner fail in 
this duty, and the Commission determine 
that the failure was the product of "willful-
ness, bad faith, . . . fault, or persistent dilato-
ry tactics," Oldroyd, 2000 UT App 75 at 1116, 
999 P.2d 588, the Commission may, at its 
discretion, levy sanctions for the failure, in-
cluding dismissal. 
H 13 Here, there is no question that Joseph 
failed to comply with the City's repeated 
discovery requests. Joseph ignored at least 
seven requests from the City over the course 
of ten months. Then, in the face of the 
City's motion to dismiss, Joseph essentially 
admitted to fault in failing to produce the 
requested material, and acknowledged that 
dismissal would result should he fail again. 
Based on Joseph's subsequent failure to com-
ply, and following Joseph's admission of fault, 
the Commission dismissed Joseph's appeal. 
U 14 After reviewing the record, we con-
clude that not only did Joseph stipulate to 
fault regarding his failure to comply with the 
requested discovery at the stipulation hear-
ing, Joseph's attorney also admitted to being 
"somewhat dilatory" regarding the City's 
discovery requests. The Commission, there-
fore, had an ample basis to justify sanction-
ing Joseph for his continued failure to com-
ply with the City's discovery requests. See 
Oldroyd, 2000 UT App 75 at U 31, 999 P.2d 
588; see also Osguthorpe, 892 P.2d at 8. 
Moreover, after accepting Joseph's initial ac-
knowledgment of fault, the Commission 
chose to extend Joseph one final opportunity 
to comply. Joseph failed to avail himself of 
diction over "[a]ny final action or order of the 
[municipal] commission" in this court 
I W-y 
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that opportunity. Accordingly, we conclude 
that the Commission did not violate Joseph's 
due process right to a post-deprivation hear-
ing. 
[12-14] 1115 Joseph next argues that the 
absence of a formal discovery order is deter-
minative. However, an agency is not re-
quired to issue an order compelling discovery 
prior to considering sanctions. See Tuck v 
Godfrey, 1999 UT App 127,119, 981 P.2d 407. 
" 'It is enough that a notice of the taking of a 
deposition or a request for inspection has 
been properly served on the party.'" Id 
(citation omitted). Furthermore, "[although 
parties deserve the opportunity to be heard, 
'dismissal . . . is appropriate when a party 
pursues a claim in a manner that abuses that 
opportunity.'" Oldroyd, 2000 UT App 75 at 
11 31, 999 P.2d 588. 
1116 There is no contention that the City 
failed to properly serve Joseph with any of 
its discovery requests. Joseph, in fact, ad-
mits having received most, if not all, of the 
requests. Joseph voluntarily entered into a 
stipulation with the City wherein he essen-
tially admitted he was at fault for the failure 
to respond to the City's discovery requests. 
He further stipulated that any additional fail-
ure on his part would result in the renewal of 
the City's motion to dismiss. Additionally, 
both Joseph and his attorney were well 
aware that the Commission had adopted the 
stipulation and had entered an additional or-
der dismissing Joseph's appeal should he fail 
to timely produce the requested discovery 
items. 
2. Specifically, Joseph argues that the penalty of 
dismissal of his appeal was disproportionate to 
the conduct; that the Commission failed to con-
sider any other reasonable sanction, that the 
1117 After reviewing the record, we con-
clude that not only was Joseph properly 
served with several discovery requests, any 
one of which was sufficient to provide Joseph 
with the notice he argues he did not receive, 
but also that Joseph was fully aware of the 
specific penalty he faced should he again fail 
to comply with the City's discovery requests. 
Therefore, Joseph's second argument fails. 
[15] U 18 Joseph raises several other is-
sues on appeal. However, because he failed 
to raise these issues with the Commission, 
we will not address them here.2 See State v. 
Holgate, 2000 UT 74,1111, 10 P.3d 346 (stat-
ing "[a]s a general rule, claims not raised 
before the trial court may not be raised on 
appeal"); Oldroyd, 2000 UT App 75 at 1124, 
999 P.2d 588 (stating " '[a]ny challenge to the 
merits of a discovery request must be timely 
filed and put before the trial court, or the 
claim will be waived'"(citation omitted)); 
Godfrey, 1999 UT App 127 at 1124, 981 P.2d 
407 (observing that a failure to raise an 
objection to a discovery sanction waives the 
objection). 
1119 Accordingly, we affirm the Commis-
sion's order dismissing Joseph's appeal. 
U 20 WE CONCUR: JUDITH M. 
BILLINGS, Associate Presiding Judge and 
PAMELA T. GREENWOOD, Judge. 
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TKORNE, Judge: 
Robert L. Joseph appeals from a finding of the Sale *f*e 
Citv Civil Service Commission (the Commission afrirming the Salt 
Lake City Police Department's (the Department) conclusion that 
Joseph »?ted unprofessionally and violated the Departments 
deadly force policy. We affirm." 
First. absent a demonstration of plain error o r ^ ; | t ; ° ^ d 
circumstances, we will not review c i t y that an g ^ ^ J ^ 
to first raise in the trial cour.. See. S T 3 ^ -^ H O ^ ° T tnrm* 
74 l S lu P.3d 346; ^ qtn v. grown, 948 P-2d 337, 343 (Utah 
1997) (stating "• Tilf a oar<-y rhrouah counsel has "*<** * . •_, 
1997) tstaLmg *i^
 f ')J f„„ nh-i^tino or has led the trial 
fiOMglT"; ^ ^;°^ T;° T rT?f r:^ r^i?S e tlH^ve thift nartv from, 
?hfir^ ?« Citation oiitted?) Therefore, we do not address 
Joseph's arguments concerning the following issues: (1) The 
M I 
Commission's decision to exclude evidence concerning statements 
made during settlement negotiations between Joseph and the 
Department; (2) the Commission's actions concerning Joseph's 
request that the Department produce a crime scene videotape; (3) 
the admissibility of Darin Bell's transcript testimony; (4) the 
Commission's decision to exclude two charts from evidence; and 
(5) the proportionality of Joseph's punishment. 
Joseph next argues that the evidence presented was 
insufficient to support the Commission's findings. To 
successfully challenge a factual finding, an appellant must first 
marshal the evidence supporting the finding. Se^ Moon v. Moon. 
1999 UT App 12,124, 973 P.2d 431. Only then is he permitted to 
attempt to demonstrate why the finding is clearly erroneous. See 
id. "When an appellant fails to meet the heavy burden of 
marshaling the evidence, we assumed that the record supports the 
findings of the trial court . . . ." Id, (citations and 
quotations omitted) (alteration in original). Here, Joseph does 
nothing more than reargue the evidence he relied upon before the 
Commission. Accordingly, because Joseph has failed to properly 
marshal the evidence, we conclude that the evidence was 
sufficient to support the Commission's findings that, Joseph 
violated the Department's deadly force policy and that his use of 
deadly force was unjustified.3 
Moreover, we review the Commission's findings only to 
determine whether the Commission "abused its discretion or 
exceeded its authority." Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1012.5 (1999). 
After reviewing the record, we conclude that the Commission had 
ample evidence available to support its findings, including the 
following facts: (1) Joseph fired at least twice at the vehicle, 
as it was moving away from him and was no longer a threat to 
either Joseph or any possible bystanders; and (2) Joseph could 
not clearly see either the car or his surroundings as he was 
firing his weapon. 
2. Joseph also argues that the Commission violated its own rules 
concerning burdens of proof and proceeding; however, the thrust 
of this argument is that the evidence was not sufficient to 
support the Commission's finding. Accordingly, Joseph is 
required to first marshal all of the evidence supporting the 
finding, and only then is he permittecT'the opportunTty~to 
demonstrate that the evidence is insufficient to support the 
finding. Se& Brewer v. Denver & *U^ fiyande W.R.R., 2001 UT 
77,1133. 31 P.3d 5S7. Because Joseph failed to properly marshal 
the evidence with respect to this claim, we assume the 
Commission's findings are correct. 
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Third, while Joseph couches his fourth argument as a 
challenge to the Commission's admission into evidence statements 
that Joseph identifies as hearsay, the actual thrust of his 
argument is a challenge to the credibility of the witnesses. 
However, the Commission, as a local administrative bcdy# is not 
strictly bound by the formal rules of evidence- See Lucas v 
Murray Citv Civil Serv. Co^^p, 949 P.2d 746, 755 (Utah Ct. App, 
1997) . So long as the evidence admitted by the Commission was 
legally relevant and the Commission provided Joseph an 
opportunity to introduce evidence of his own, as well as the 
opportunity to cross-examine the City's witnesses and challenge 
their credibility, we will conclude that the Commission acted 
within the scope of their authority. See id. at 756• Moreover, 
we defer to the initial decision maker in assessments of 
credibility and evaluations of evidence. See Drake v. Industrial 
Comm'n, 939 P.2d 177, 181 (Utah 1997). 
Having reviewed the record, we conclude that the Commission 
did not err in admitting into evidence the testimony challenged 
by Joseph on appeal.1 The testimony was clearly relevant to the 
Commission's determinations, and the Commission gave Joseph the 
opportunity to present his own counter witnesses and to cross-
examine the Department's witnesses. Additionally, the record 
clearly shows that the Commission examined all of the evidence 
placed before it prior to making its determination. Therefore, 
we conclude that the Commission's decision was well within its 
discretionary bounds. 
Finally, because Joseph's remaining issues are without 
merit, we do not address these claims. Rather, we explain why 
each issue is without merit. See State v. Carter, 776 P.2d 886, 
.888-89 (Utah 1989) . 
First, the Commission ruled in favor of Joseph and excluded 
the letter written by Assistant District Attorney Richard 
Shepard. Therefore, the letter was never introduced as evidence 
during the hearing. Second, the Commission enforced Joseph's 
subpoena, ordering the Department to comply. Third, the 
Commission admitted into evidence documents concerning twc 
previous unrelated shootings, and there is nothing in the record 
to indicate that the Commission failed to review these documents 
prior to concluding that Joseph acted out of policy. Fourth, 
there is nothing to support Joseph's contention that the 
Commission denied him the opportunity to introduce evidence of 
3. We can see nothing to suggest that Joseph objected to the 
testimony during the hearing. Hcwever, rather than disposing of 
this argument on preservation grounds, see State v. Holcate, 2000 
UT 74,1ll, 10 ?.3d 346, we address it on the merits. 
200CZ111-CA to-
the Department's bias im-—.-
its determination that T««S£' °r 5etal-iatory motive reaar*<n 
record does not support Josenh^^?, °ut °* Policy FlnISy^?hfl 
allowed the Department t o ° S f v cUT?011 ***** O o S S ; ^ 
decision to delude a f i n ^ f c l ^ 2 ^ \ 3 £ - l 
Accordingly,
 w e , f f l r - ^ C o m m i s s i o n , s ^ . ^ 
William A. Thome J r w fludge 
WE CONCUR: 
Judith M. Billings, 
Associate Presiding Judge 
Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge 
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Diplomate American Board of Psychiatry & Neurology, inc. 
General Adult Psychiatry independent Medical Evaluations 
Statement of Conditions 
for 
Independent Medical Evaluation 
doctor 
( 
It is important that you understand and sign this statement before you meet with the 
According to the Ethical Guidelines for the Practice of Forensic Psychiatry, patients must 
give consent to special circumstances of examination The following understanding is also 
necessary to maximize impartiality and objectivity 
Unless you understand and sign this statement, DR. McCANN WILL NOT PROCEED 
WITH THE EXAMINATION If you do not wish to be examined under these conditions, 
contact the person who requested the examination prior to the date of your appointment with Dr 
McCann 
* * * 
I understand that SALT LAKE CITY CORP has requested that David 
L McCann, M D perform a psychiatric examination and provide a report at their expense Dr 
McCann is in independent private practice His opinion may be used to justify a change in 
compensation or job status, but no decisions about compensation or job status are made by Dr 
McCann In submitting to this examination I authorize Dr McCann to obtain information from 
any source or person he deems necessary to complete the report I understand Dr McCann 
begins all evaluations with the identified patient alone. Other persons may or may not be included 
at Dr. McCann's discretion. It is Dr. McCann's role to provide evaluation and not treatment. I 
understand that it is his policy to release the final report to the above named agency only This 
statement waives any right to my direct access or direct access by my legal counsel (Utah Code 
Ann, 78-25-25, 1953 as amended) to the medical records from Dr. McCann's office Reports 
may be requested from the above named person or agency. This statement does not prevent Dr 
Davidi^McCann from participating in a deposition or other legal proceedings if requested by my 
"attorney or^rovidingspecific information regarding findings relevant to needs for urgent medical 
\ 
care 
v r& n/ 
t 
WITNESS 
yl/oo 1 5 EXHIBlT" I 03-0797 
DATE 
4190 Highland Drive, Suite 102 
Holladay, UT 84124 
Phone(801) 272-9205 Fax 801 -272-9208 \7& 
